911day Commentary Learning From Experience Prevents Tragedy
I was here in NY on 911day. My first thought upon discussing it on the night of September 11 was to question why the government didn't launch Phantom jets from Ft. Lee, NJ, only ten to fifteen seconds away. We're told that after the first plane crashed into the first tower, Cheney ordered jets to protect the White House. Less than three minutes from the issuance of his command, jets were flying formation over the White House.
Six minutes after that, the second plane, heading north, did something that attracted the attention of several air traffic controllers because none of them had EVER seen a commercial jet flying north suddenly turn around one hundred and eighty degrees, head back unannounced back towards New York City, and, with no announcement, understanding, or comprehension, become no long apparent to anyone looking at the air traffic control radar screen!
It was some twelve minutes or more minutes later that the second plane hit. Never mind Alert Crews trained to get airborne in three minutes or less; we're talking twenty-eight unendurably long minutes - unendurable in the most literal definition of the word, because almost all of the victims would absolutely not have died had the second tower been protected.
As quick as any of us are to discount and discredit the surfeit of conspiracy theorists, no sane investigator, no rational thinker can long operate under the delusions that attend to strings of facts being ignored or deprecated in the face of such horrible events.
The wealth of knowledge available made it clear that the government knew that Osama bin Laden's operatives were planning to crash planes into the World Trade Center. Those are quoted phrases from documents in the public domain.
There is no doubt that both government and non-government sources had clear and definitive information that the World Trade Center would be attacked by hijacked aircraft. Let us not be distracted from facts by Monday morning quarterbacks who insist that it's all too easy to cast identifiably responsibility after the fact, and that the unprecedented nature of the attack made it impossible to accurately predict. You see, "predict" carries a distinct connotation of talent, of an ability not available to all humans That's patently inaccurate.
Viewed in the diluted use of public service, predictions are made based on intelligence and the handling of that intelligence.
On Sep 12, 2001, the only way you could fly on a plane within American airspace was if your family name was Bin Laden.
Think about the consequences. Some one hundred and forty relatives of Bin Laden, all of them members of the Bin Laden family boarded those aircraft in cities across the country, were all flown to Boston, then flown to Saudi Arabia under protection of the American Government. At no time were FBI or other federal investigators ever allowed to question the relatives of Osama bin Laden. For several years after 911day the Saudi Arabians persisted in denying American investigators any form of access to any family members for questioning.
Approximately every murder investigation in every nation on earth, and certainly more so in the case of people suspected of mass murder, includes interviews with family members. "Do you know where he is or might be?" or "Are you in contact with him?" Yet, not a word, not a question; all under the protection of the gentleman whose family has literally decades of business ties together with the Bin Laden family, the same gentleman who happened to become U.S. President and was purportedly protecting America at the time of the 911day attacks. All murder investigations... ... ... except one.
Only someone with personal or professional interests at stake - or gullible - is going to believe that the U.S. Government could not find Osama bin Laden or any other man on earth they wished to find. A month or two, sure. Three months? Perhaps, although even that is a stretch when you consider the unlimited resources available for this task. A year and two years and beyond? Please.
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